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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Amazon Basin: historical and geographic antecedents
Much less is known about the Amazon river basin than about
the North Pole. Amazonia remains, in many senses, the last fron-
tier of mankind. Everything in it is superlative: it is the richest
area in the globe in diversity of vegetation, and the largest cov-
vered by tropical rain forest; spanning an area of 5,870,000 square
kilometres, equivalent to more than half the size of Europe, it en-
compasses large portions of at least eight countries; it is criss-
crossed by some 80,000 kilometres of waterways, most of them
navigable, and contains nearly one-fifth of all the fresh water run-
ning on the surface of the earth; its drainage basin is more than
twice the size of any other, and the discharge of the Amazon river
proper, at the rate of 4.2 million cubic feet per second, is seven
times higher than that of the Mississippi; and it is inhabited by a
population loosely estimated at ten million.
Alternatively viewed as an "Eldorado" by the Spanish conquis-
tadores of the 16th and 17th centuries and their Portuguese,
French, English and Dutch counterparts bold enough to venture
into its seemingly impenetrable foliage, and as a "Green Hell" by
all those settlers in quest of gold, rubber, oil, or other riches, who
ever since have tried to bend the savage forest to their will, Ama-
zonia has lured many adventurers in search of its elusive wealth,
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only to engulf them with the exquisite perversity of a carnivorous
plant.
The recorded history of Amazonia is that of human greed.
Whether it was the search for precious metals and stones, or Indi-
ans to be enslaved, or sheer territorial aggrandizement, Amazonia
was prey to the feuds of distant warring kings. The political map
of northern South America, as well as the remnants of ancient
forts and cannon rotting in the jungle, bear witness to their ambi-
tions. While the French, the English and the Dutch colonized the
coastal fringe in the area corresponding today to the Guyanas, the
Portuguese bandeirantes pushed westwards, preempting the vast
open spaces of jungle and savannah east of the Andes left fallow
by the absence of European settlements in what would have been
Spanish domain under the Treaty of Tordesillas. 1 The political
geography of Amazonia, thus defined, explains why over 60% of
the region became Portuguese and eventually Brazilian territory.
The Spaniard Vicente Yafiez Pinz6n discovered the Amazon
river in 1500, and called it the Sweet Sea. In 1541, a compatriot of
his, Francisco de Orellana,2 sailed the river from close to its source
in the Andes to the Atlantic, but it was not until 1638 that the trip
was made in the reverse direction by the Portuguese Pedro Teix-
eira. In 1755, the then Portuguese Prime Minister, the Marquis of
Pombal, established a trading company, the General Company of
Grdo Para and Maranhdo, for the purpose of exploiting forest pro-
ducts and notably spices ("Drogas do sertdo") as well as cattle,
and military garrisons were posted to guard its holdings.
There followed a period of relative calm, interrupted by the
visits of all manner of both genuine and allegedly scientific expedi-
tions, generally viewed with jaundiced eyes by the Imperial Gov-
ernment of Brazil, and in the mid-19th century the Emperor, D.
Petro II, bowing to combined British and American pressure,
The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) apportioned the non-Christian world yet to be dis-
covered between Portugal and Spain, and followed the bull of Pope Alexander VI (Borgia)
which had given the New World to Spain while Africa and India were ascribed to Portugal;
the new demarcation line gave Portugal a claim to Brazil (discovered in 1500). Under the
doctrine of uti possidetis, effective occupation by Portuguese settlers greatly expanded the
area allotted to Portugal by the Treaty, at the expense of Spain. This was accepted by
Spain under the Treaty of Madrid of 1750. In 1777, the Treaty of San Ildefonso asserted
Portuguese rights over much of the territory granted to Spain at Tordesillas.
2 Orellana was a companion of Pizarro in the conquest of Per6; in the course of an expedi-
tion into the interior his detachment straggled at the Napo River and sailed down the
Amazon, so christened because of the legend of native female warriors believed to inhabit
the forest. Orellana reached the mouth of the river in 1541, but a later attempt to return
upstream ended in his death.
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reluctantly opened the Amazon river to international navigation
(1866). At approximately this time, by virtue of the burgeoning In-
dustrial Revolution and the world's demand for rubber, predatory
exploitation of Amazonian rubber began, and the "boom" ensued,
leading to the ephemeral prosperity of the port cities of Manaus
and Bel~m (the latter at the estuary of the Amazon), only to dwin-
dle around 1910, with fresh competition from the much improved
plantations started by the British and the Dutch in Malaya and
Sumatra, respectively. In 1927, the Ford Motor Co. opened two
large rubber plantations on the Tapaj6s river - Fordlandia and
Belterra-which, although they subsequently failed (despite a
brief ressuscitation during World War I), proved that Amazonia
was, indeed, fit for human settlement and productive enterprise,
despite the climate and the prevalence of tropical disease.
The rubber boom focused attention on the Brazilian Amazon,
and a number of disputes arose over ill-defined boundaries. Those
between Brazil and French Guyana were settled by a Swiss ar-
bitral award in 1900 (the Amapi Question), in favour of Brazil,
whereas the frontier with British Guyana, settled by an arbitral
award rendered by the King of Italy in 1904, was apportioned be-
tween the two countries. In 1903, a Sudeten-like situation, engen-
dered by the presence of Brazilian rubber workers in the Acre
territory of Bolivia, operated by the United States-based Bolivian
Syndicate, led to outbursts of violence, ultimately settled by the
Treaty of Petr6polis of 1903, whereby Brazil purchased the terri-
tory in question from Bolivia in exchange for financial compensa-
tion and a commitment to build the Madeira-Mamor6 railway, now
abandoned but which at the time cost at least one life for every
railway tie.
A similar outbreak of jungle violence occurred in Putumayo,
Perfi, at a rubber concession operated by the British Peruvian
Amizon Co. Ltd. Ecuador ceded some of her Amazonian territory
to Brazil in 1904, and to Colombia in 1916. In 1932, a brief war
erupted between Per6 and Colombia over the territory of Leticia,
which was settled through the intervention of the League of Na-
tions, and in 1941, Peru' and Ecuador again went to war over a
century-old, festering boundary conflict, which was only half re-
solved by a treaty of 1942, whereby Peru' acquired a considerable
portion of Ecuadorean territory in the Amazon region. Similar ter-
ritorial claims exist between Venezuela and Guyana-the Esse-
quibo question, now in abeyance pending a moratorium which will
expire in 1982-and to some extent between Guyana and
Suriname, who also share contested territory.
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Clearly, the colonial inheritance in northern South America, en-
compassing the Amazon river basin, left territorial boundaries
unclearly charted in those wild reaches and, as a result, plenty of
blood was spilt in the jungle, a silent witness to the untold misery
accruing from greed. The smouldering resentment left in some
countries of the area over what are deemed to be unfair settle-
ments, whether by force of arms or binding arbitration, heralds
potential trouble spots for the hemisphere, thus enhancing what is
already a heightened regional sensitivity to security considera-
tions.
An illustration of this sensitivity is afforded by the Brazilian re-
action to UNESCO's initiative in 1948 to establish a science-
oriented International Institute of the Amazon Hylaea.3 Although
it had been a Brazilian scientist who originally spearheaded the
idea, ulterior and somewhat sinister motives were perceived in it,
and as a consequence the entire effort had to be scuttled. A simi-
lar reaction was evoked by the idea floated more recently by the
futurologist Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute, aiming at the
creation of huge man-made lakes by damming up some of the
rivers in the Amazon basin.' While the scheme may have been
hare-brained to begin with, the nationalist feelings aroused by it
in Brazil never permitted an in-depth public discussion of its tech-
nical aspects.
During the post-World War II period, the Amazonian economy
remained fairly stagnant until the 1950's when Japanese settlers
in the Brazilian State of Pari resumed the practice of the early
colonial days and planted spices, such as vanilla and pepper, thus
The expression Hylaea had been coined by the German naturalist von Humboldt (1769-
1859) to describe the Amazonian rain forest. In 1948, UNESCO convened a conference at
Iquitos, Per6i (3,750 Km. upriver from the mouth of the Amazon), which was attended by
governmental representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Per6i, and Venezuela aiming at the establishment of a scientific institution
devoted to the study of the Amazonian humid tropic. The resulting agreement (doc.
UNESCO/NS/ILHA/10 Annex I, 1948) was signed by all of the participants, but eventually
ratified only by Ecuador and France. Domestic political controversy aroused in Brazil by
this initiative, perceived as an attempt to 'internationalize' Amazonia, prompted the Con-
gress and the military to oppose it and it subsequently fell into oblivion. Esther Crampton,
Brazilian Nationalism and the Defeat of the International Institute of the Amazon Hylaea
(1970) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The American University, Washington, D.C.).
In 1968, Mr. Kahn advocated turning the Amazon into a vast inland lake, and also the
interconnection of the Amazon, Orinoco, and River Plate Basins in order to facilitate the
generation of hydroelectricity and the transport of the area's natural resources. This pro-
posal, which would appear to have been insufficiently substantiated by factual research,
stirred a storm of controversy in Brazil and contributed to heighten that nation's sensi-
tivity to foreign interest in Amazonia. Kahn & Panero, Novo enfoque sobre a Amazonia,
41/2 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE POLITICA INTERNACIONAL 1-214 (1968).
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introducing agricultural alternatives into the region. After the
new capital of Brazil, Brasilia, was officially inaugurated in 1960, a
road was built linking it to Beldm, and a network of paved high-
ways was soon crisscrossing the entire Brazilian portion of the
Amazon basin. Notable among these is the Trans-Amazon High-
way, which, if superimposed on a map of Europe, would stretch
from Lisbon to Moscow.
The policy of occupation of the scarcely populated Amazonian
hinterland by surplus population from the impoverished north-
eastern part of the country, with settlements strung along the ex-
tended network newly carved out of the jungle, springs from geo-
political concepts ("live frontiers") espoused by the Brazilian
leadership, and is closely linked with the national drive towards
development of the Amazon basin and its integration into the
mainstream of the country's economy, from which it had for so
long been isolated by virtue of sheer lack of communication. If the
doctrine is justifiable from a national security perspective,
especially in view of the threat or reality of guerrilla warfare on
the Amazonian perimetre in the mid- and late 1960's, from the
standpoint of an effective settlement program, its implementation
was not an unmitigated success. This was largely because of the
general scarcity of knowledge, in Brazil and elsewhere, about the
unique factors conditioning life and agricultural production within
Amazonia. Nevertheless, most of the roads planned were actually
built (against staggering odds) and, thanks to a generous system
of federal fiscal incentives, both public and private investment has
been funnelled into the region as a matter of high national prior-
ity.'
I Under the influence of these geopolitical doctrines and the attendant national security
considerations, the military, which assumed power in Brazil in 1964, gave impetus to
policies designed to provide Amazonia with the physical infrastructure that would not only
integrate the region with the rest of the country but also provide a basis for a colonization
program, much along the lines of homesteading for the American pioneers of the 19th cen-
tury. As a result of "Operation Amazonia' launched by the Brazilian Government in 1965-67,
a Superintendancy for the Development of the Amazon (SUDAM) was created in 1966, and
a new Program for National Integration, of epic proportions, was started in 1970, taking the
form of construction of a complex network of 'penetration roads,' river ports, airports and
telecommunications facilities. The Second National Development Plan for 1975-79 main-
tained these priorities, but in light of the poor results of the original settlement program,
several improvements were made therein, notably through the Polamazonia program of
1974, which operates through 15 poles for the development of the area's agricultural, live-
stock and mineral resources. D. MAHAR, FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL: A STUDY OF
AMAZONIA (1979). These purely domestic programs are at the root of the move towards the
conclusion of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation.
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B. The development of Amazonia
Despite the vigorous efforts undertaken recently to gain better
insights into the economic resources of Amazonia, not only by
Brazil but also, in a modest but growing measure, by the seven
other nations encompassing the Amazon basin, the latter remains
largely untapped. For instance, it is estimated that the hydroelec-
tric power potential of the basin is of the order of 5,500 million
kilowatts. Six major hydropower projects are currently being
planned, with another forty-five under study. Amazonia's fauna
and flora are the richest on Earth, its rivers among the longest
and most voluminous. Oil was found in the Amazonian territories
of Ecuador and Peru, coal in Colombia, iron ore, manganese, gold,
uranium, cassiterite and bauxite in Brazil, the latter also in Guy-
ana, Suriname and Venezuela. Agricultural production with an ex-
port potential includes lumber, rubber, jute, cocoa, African palm,
Brazil nuts, spices, etc., in addition to cattle and fisheries.
From the little that is known about it, Amazonia is a vast reser-
voir of economically vital natural resources. This is not to say that
there are not yet large-scale infrastructure development projects
and industrial enterprises active in the area. They do indeed exist,
and as everything else in Amazonia, on a superlative scale. Eco-
nomic development in the area tends towards the predatory style
of exploitation. It is often assumed that the governments of the
area encourage this approach, just as they are suspected of sup-
porting in the name of economic growth the assaults perpetrated
by greedy landholders and commercial speculators against the life
and property of the local indigenous population. This is clearly not
the case, but the difficulties inherent in enforcing police jurisdic-
tion, in its various manifestations, over an area as vast and of such
difficult access as Amazonia lend credence to such assumptions,
and the best intentioned governments find themselves powerless
to control private actions in the remote reaches of the basin. The
dichotomy between short-term private gain and long-term public
interest is perhaps nowhere as crass as it is in Amazonia.
One of the major problems encountered in the development of
this area, largely covered by rain forests, lies in its deforestation,
which causes deleterious effects on both local and global climate
as well as on human populations depending on the forest for their
livelihood. Among the causes for deforestation may be listed an in-
appropriate system of fiscal incentives, which encourages the
clearing of forests for cattle-grazing; the availability of alternative
investments yielding higher returns than sustainable land
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management in the area; a land tenure system traditionally
favouring deforestation; the low price of land in the face of
rapidly-increasing demand for it from a mushrooming population;
an ingrained disregard for conservation laws; and very weak law
enforcement machinery in the area.
The balance of the ecosystem depends on the intense circulation
of the vegetation's life cycle. In the case of Brazil, the government
is attempting to formulate and enforce a forest policy, patterned
after the zoning concept, which would determine the carrying
capacity for colonization projects with a view to sustaining the
human population at an adequate standard without environmental
degradation.' The adoption of regulations designed to contain the
deforestation process presupposes a knowledge of its underlying
causes. It would appear that any solution would embody a rational
policy of national incentives, as opposed to sanctions, in support of
a common forest development policy to be adopted at the regional
level for all Amazonian countries, pursuant to the Treaty for
Amazonian Cooperation, which gives legal form and cogency to
the concept of ecodevelopment, i e., the harmonization of the inter-
relationships between man and nature and man and society!
Aside from the vicissitudes of nature, there are many con-
straints on the development of Amazonia. They stem to a large ex-
tent from the pattern of human settlement in the area, marked by
a low population density, its uneven spatial distribution, and its
poor education, which place obstacles on the way to a satisfactory
level of productivity. Entrepreneurial, managerial and technical
talent are scarce; there is a traditional dependency on extractive
activities as sources of employment and income. The regional
market is narrow, and until recently, i.e., the early 1960's, there
were nearly insurmountable difficulties of communication except
by air, despite an extensive network of navigable waterways. The
high cost of transport of course influenced the prices of all other
factors of production (except labour), with the result that the only
viable enterprises, aside from government sponsored and heavily
subsidized development projects, had to be assured of a very high
rate of return in order to cover costs. This explains in part the
predatory character of rubber exploitation, for instance, resulting
in its shift to Southeast Asia. Last but by no means least in this
list of material constraints, the illusory fertility of the area, as
' Fearnside, The Development of the Amazon Rain Forest. Priority Problems for the
Formulation of Guidelines, 4 INTERCIENCIA 338-42 (1979).
E. ODUM. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND THE ATTITUDE REVOLUTION (1976).
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reflected in its luxuriant vegetation, is betrayed by the poor qual-
ity of most of its soil and sub-soil, largely consisting of laterite; the
only soil of consistently good quality in the Amazon is to be found
in the flood plains along the main rivers.
While Brazil had the most ambitious and sustained effort for
the development of the Amazon basin, other countries have to a
certain extent also undertaken their own schemes for the im-
provement of their Amazonian territories. These efforts, however,
pale by comparison with those of Brazil, and are really only at an
incipient stage. Different countries pursue different goals in this
connection. For Bolivia, for instance, a landlocked nation, access to
the sea is a critical issue, and therefore river navigation acquires
considerable importance as a means to break the bondage of
"mediterraneity." Peru sought geopolitical, defensive objectives
in building the Carretera Marginal de la Selva, to be known in the
future as the Bolivarian highway, skirting the Brazilian border
rather than intersecting it so as to permit inter-modal river-and-
road transport from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Ecuador is
intent on a colonization scheme. Colombia wishes to develop the
area surrounding Leticia, which is economically much closer to
Brazil and Per6 than to the mainstream of the national economy,
from which the city, an important river port, is virtually isolated.
Venezuela is concerned with her boundary security. Guyana and
Suriname face problems of migration and smuggling along their
borders.
While individual nations have in the recent past sought to put
into effect some semblance of development programs for their
Amazonian territories, these have yet to yield sizeable results.
What is clearly needed is an integrated approach such as that
which the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation can help to bring
about, triggering international collaboration for the solution of
common problems. It is important, in this respect, that the
momentum generated by the Treaty, indeed, the awareness of a
common Amazonian interest, not be lost through delays in its im-
plementation.
II. THE TREATY FOR AMAZONIAN COOPERATION
A. Background and scope
The Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (TAC) was signed in
Brasilia on July 3, 1978, by the Foreign Ministers of the eight
countries sharing the Amazon basin-Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
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Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. It was ratified
by all of the countries and entered into effect on August 3, 1980,
one month after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by
Venezuela, the last to grant approval. The first meeting of For-
eign Ministers under the Treaty is scheduled to take place on Oc-
tober 23-24, 1980, at Bel~m, State of Para, Brazil.
This Treaty is a remarkable document, in that (i) it revitalizes
the faltering process of Latin American economic integration by
substituting the concept of physical integration for the relatively
modest advances accomplished within various subregional group-
ings in the domain of trade;' (ii) it brings about a long overdue con-
vergence between the Andean group, on the one hand, and Brazil,
on the other, thus overcoming what had been for many years a
somewhat strained political relationship; (iii) recognizing that un-
trammelled economic growth must, within the framework of
development, be balanced with ecological conservation, it institu-
tionalizes the concept of internationally enforceable environmen-
tal protection for what constitutes in effect one of the most frail
ecosystems on this planet; and (iv) it provides the legal foundation
for the harmonious development, by means of controlled human
occupation, of a unique and enormous area of land and water still
virtually in its pristine state which, through the judicious applica-
tion of appropriate technology, may yet play a role of extraordi-
nary economic and social significance in a continent plagued by
one of the world's highest rates of demographic expansion.'
In its twenty-eight articles, the Treaty provides for cooperation
in scientific and technological research as well as in exchanges of
information regarding the most diverse aspects of Amazonian
development; indeed, technology looms large in the stipulations of
the Treaty. The TAC, moreover, provides for the rational use of
hydrological and other natural resources, with due regard to the
ecological balance and the preservation of indigenous cultures-
and one may regret that the introduction of the latter topic seems
to have been made peripherally and more as an afterthought than
as one of the essential provisions of the document. It further pro-
vides for the establishment of an infrastructure for transport and
' To be considered in any plan of ecodevelopment are the countries of Central America,
the Caribbean, the Andean Group and LAFTA, the Latin American Free Trade Associa-
tion, which encompasses Mexico and most of South America.
' The current average population growth of Latin America is 2.8% per annum. The pres-
ent population of 350 million is projected to reach 600 million by the year 2000. Thus, during
the last quarter of this century, the population of Latin America will almost double. 9
BOLETIN DEMOGRAFICO 1 (1976).
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communications with full freedom for navigation on Amazonia's
international rivers; for sanitation and the control of epidemics;
for the promotion of border trade and of tourism; and so forth.
The bulk of this varied activity is to be carried out in each par-
ticipating country by a Permanent National Commission to be
established by the respective government. Unlike the River Plate
Basin Treaty of 1969, from which it derived in part its inspiration,
the Amazonian Treaty did not create a central and permanent co-
ordinating body of an intergovernmental character, nor a central-
ized Secretariat. Rather, it provided for periodic meetings of For-
eign Ministers of the contracting parties and for annual meetings
of the Amazon Cooperation Council, instituted by the TAC, con-
sisting of senior diplomatic representatives from each country,
both bodies to be serviced on an ad hoc rotating basis by the
government of the country where such meetings take place. Such
flimsy institutional arrangements are of a nature to arouse mis-
givings about the practical implementation of the Treaty's provi-
sions.
Nevertheless, from a political and diplomatic standpoint, there
can be no doubt that Brazil's initiative in sponsoring the Treaty
for Amazonian Cooperation was successful, by and large, on a
variety of scores, regardless of the fact that the text eventually
adopted (after only eighteen months of negotiations) differs mark-
edly, in several respects, from Brazil's original proposals, whose
adoption would have entailed an even bolder approach to the
development of Amazonia. The substantial changes which the
agreement underwent during the process of its negotiation illus-
trate the lingering suspicion of the Andean countries vis-a-vis
Brazil, historically viewed as a territorial colossus with hegemonic
ambitions (notwithstanding reality to the contrary)." It also re-
flects the desire of the seven other signatories not to let the TAC
become a means for Brazil to assert further moral if not legal
rights vis-a-vis Argentina in the smouldering dispute over hydro-
power exploitation projects on the Parana River. Although this
issue was resolved subsequently to mutual satisfaction, at the
time of negotiations of the Amazonian Treaty, the Andean nations
were anxious to avoid upsetting the balance of power in the
Southern cone.
In order to allay these suspicious and thereby pave the way for
a successful negotiation of the TAC, Brazil embarked upon a
'0 See, e.g., Gen. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin (former Foreign and Prime Minister of Peri),
Pacto Amazdnico: dominaci6n o integraci6n?, in 583/4/5 SEMANA (Caracas) (December 1979).
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veritable diplomatic offensive vis-a-vis the Andean group, through
a series of state visits at the level of Chiefs of State and Foreign
Ministers.1' At the latest such visit, the Foreign Minister of Brazil
met in January 1980, in Lima, with his counterparts from the five
members of the Cartagena Agreement (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Per6 and Venezuela), which resulted in the adoption of guide-
lines for mutual cooperation in the fields of trade and technology.
Implementation of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation without
prejudice to the strengthening of the Latin American Economic
System (SELA) was one of the items discussed. It can be said that
Brazil's relationship with the Andean group-which in the mean-
time has acquired momentum enough to become a political force in
its own right-is now blossoming, which should facilitate imple-
mentation of the TAC.
In essence, Brazil's goal of securing international agreement for
the concerted development of a physical infrastructure of inte-
grated transport and communications networks ultimately linking
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was replaced by a mere frame-
work for the coordinated development of the Amazon basin
through strictly national efforts and, it may be hoped, with an
equitable distribution of its benefits among all parties. At a time
of recrudescence in East-West tensions and of heightened political
sensitivity, for the United States, regarding various parts of Latin
America (e.g., the Caribbean and Central America), Amazonia may
no longer be viewed as a geopolitical backwater. As the "heart-
land" of the continent and as a reservoir of largely untapped
wealth of strategic significance, the area has belatedly come to be
acknowledged as possessing geopolitical as well as economic im-
portance, a fact of which the parties to the Treaty for Amazonian
Cooperation were not unmindful.
As any instrument in the nature of a minimal consensus, the
Treaty reflects the particular idiosyncrasies of the signatory
states, notably their emphasis on national sovereignty, as ex-
pressed in the unanimity rule for the decision-making process.
Thus, the Andean countries saw to it that the new agreement,
purposefully kept vague, could not overshadow either the Andean
Pact itself or the Latin American Economic System (SELA). As
" The President of Per6, Gen. Morales Bermidez, met at the border with the President
of Brazil, Gen. Geisel, in late 1976; the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andrds Pdrez, visited
Brazil in November 1977, and gave his vital endorsement to the pending Treaty; the Presi-
dent of Per6, Gen. Morales Bermudez, visited Brazil in October 1979, and the newly-elected
President of Brazil, Gen. Figueiredo, visited Venezuela in December 1979.
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further evidence of the prevailing sensitivity to national sover-
eignty, witness the insistence of some of the negotiators of the
agreement, whose countries are embroiled in territorial disputes
in different degrees of cogency, on a clause regarding the inviola-
bility of territorial boundaries and the non-renunciation of claims
pertinent thereto. For Brazil, who has no such claims, it was easy
to accept this clause, despite the fact that the country's boun-
daries within the Amazon region, totalling some 11,000 km., are
nearly three times the length of her Atlantic coastline (4,600 km.).
The shared concern of most of the signatories in not setting up
a customs union, as originally proposed by Brazil, nor multilateral
machinery designed to implement the lofty if somewhat vague
aspirations embodied in the Treaty, is reflected in the latter's lack
of definitions, to such an extent that nowhere in the text is there
to be found a precise statement of its geographic scope. Nor, in-
deed, are there any more explicit guidelines concerning criteria
for regional cooperation, the utilization of international water-
ways both for navigational and other economic purposes, or the
role of foreign private investment. These and other aspects were
left for future, ad hoc resolution, presumably by the Foreign
Ministers upon recommendation from the Amazon Cooperation
Council. The only real commitment enshrined in the Treaty is that
of reciprocal consultations on matters deemed by the contracting
parties to be relevant to the development of their respective
Amazonian territories. Even this modest achievement, however,
in creating at the very least a multilateral awareness or conscious-
ness of the need for a balanced approach to the development of
the Amazon basin, already can be termed a constructive first step
in this direction.12
B. Negotiation of the Treaty
With 63.3% of the Amazon basin within its territory, and de-
sirous of safeguarding it against foreign interference, in Novem-
ber 1976, Brazil took the diplomatic initiative of proposing a treaty
to her Amazonian neighbors, with a view to establishing an inte-
grated physical infrastructure within the basin. In proposing the
Amazonian Treaty, the Brazilian government departed from prece-
dent; the diplomacy of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty)
" Cf. U. SCHERFENBERG, DER AMAZONASPAKT: INHALT, ZIELE UND PROBLEME EINES NEUEN
INTEGRATIONSVERTRAGS 18-23 (1979) (Hamburg, Institut fur Iberoamerika-Kunde). See also
Landau, Tratado de Cooperaci6n Amaz6nica: nuevo ensayo de integraci6n, INTEGRACION
LATINOAMERICANA 3-10 (1978).
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has traditionally relied on bilateral relationships rather than on
the institutionalization of multilateral machinery. Among the
reasons which prompted Brazil to take this initiative are consider-
ations of a security, diplomatic and economic nature. The former
refer to the strategic nature of Brazil's empty "hinterland" and,
perhaps, also to concern with the use of Guyana and certain Carib-
bean islands as refuelling stops for Cuban military flights to
Africa. The diplomatic motivation may have sprung from Brazil's
growing sense of estrangement from the Andean group and
especially in respect of Venezuela,"3 whose oil may also have
spurred the Brazilian interest. On the economic front, there was
the interest in extending to neighboring areas the massive plan
for development of the natural resources of the Amazon basin,
while securing access to the Pacific Ocean. The other seven coun-
tries were initially approached on a bilateral basis and accepted
the idea of attending a meeting, which was convened in Brasilia in
March of 1977 and attended by representatives of the other seven
countries, who considered a working paper introduced by the Ita-
maraty.
A first round of negotiations took place in Brasilia on November
28-30, 1977, immediately following the state visit to Brazil of
Venezuelan President Carlos Andrds Perez. The other countries
took the position that Itamaraty's working document was too in-
cisive, and proceeded to defuse it; for example, by substituting the
concept of economic cooperation for that of physical integration.
A second round of negotiations took place in March 1978, again in
Brasilia, to consider a revised Brazilian working paper as well as
proposals from other participants. Venezuela, for instance, lobbied
for the provisions concerning the non-renunciation of territorial
clamis (embodied in Article XIX of the Treaty), protection of indi-
genous populations (Article XIII) and a specific proposal on the
use of river resources, regarding which no consensus could be
reached. A third and final round of negotiations was held in
Caracas on May 15-18, 1978, when the final text of the agreement
was approved.
Perceptions of the significance of the Treaty vary. It has been
said, and not without reason, that "The main significance of the
Amazon Pact lies in the decision of the contracting parties to con-
sult on the development of their geopolitically sensitive frontier
areas and to pay more attention than in the past to the ecological
" Roett, Brazil Ascendant- International Relations and Geopolitics in the Late 20th Cen-
tury, 29 J. OF INT'L AFFAIRS (1975).
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dangers inherent in the unbridled exploitation of the Amazon re-
gion.""4 This would be a relatively modest accomplishment, if a
sobering one, and perhaps not unimportant in a zone as volatile as
that of northern South America.
C. Legal-institutional issues raised by the Treaty
The Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (TAC)5 has a number of
implications of a legal-institutional nature which deserve close
scrutiny, beginning with the consideranda for the Treaty, which
state as its objectives the promotion of the "harmonious develop-
ment of the Amazon region" and "an equitable distribution of the
benefits of said development." Given the unequal geographic
share that the eight signatory countries have in the Amazon re-
gion, this should be construed as being in line with the overall
inter-American policy, reflected in other hemispheric fora and in-
stitutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and
the Inter-American Development Bank (1DB), to the effect that
preference will be given to the lesser-developed countries within
the region.
Indeed, this basic principle is reflected in Article XVII of the
Treaty, whereby the contracting parties commit themselves "to
give special attention to the consideration of initiatives presented
by the least developed countries which require joint action and ef-
forts by the contracting parties." Even though it is nowhere de-
fined which are the least developed countries within the Amazon
sub-region, it can be surmised that they comprise Bolivia, Guyana
and Suriname, with the possible inclusion of Ecuador (as being in
the least developed category as defined, e.g., by the IDB, notwith-
standing the country's membership in OPEC), and despite the fact
that Suriname's per capita income is one of Latin America's high-
est in view of that nation's plentiful natural resources and rela-
tively small population (389,000 in 1978)."8
" Bond, Venezuela, Brazil and the Amazon Basin, 22 ORBIs 644 (Fall 1978).
For full text, see 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1045 (1978).
I, According to the IDB (Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1978 Report),
the following are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rates for the eight signa-
tories of the TAC:
Bolivia 479.9
Brazil 1,121.8
Colombia 637.1
Ecuador 627.1
Guyana 553.6
Per6 848.0
Suriname 2,110.0
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Another of the consideranda of the TAC is one of the factors
which make this instrument so unique, namely, the assertion that
"so as to achieve overall development of [the contracting parties']
respective Amazonian territories, it is necessary to maintain a
balance between economic growth and conservation of the en-
vironment." This notion reflects the spirit of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), but
this would appear to be the first, if not the only, instance in which
it has been formally adopted as one of the principles underlying a
treaty, albeit not in a binding clause. 7 Given the frail ecosystems
of the Amazon region and the wholesale ecological destruction
wrought by unshackled commercial exploitation of the region's
natural resources, such as lumber, this expression of concern by
the signatory governments, also reflected elsewhere in the Trea-
ty, even if thus far unaccompanied in practice by either a binding
agreement or by any enforcement measures (aside from the re-
search and information exchanges envisaged in Article VII of the
Treaty), should be hailed as a significant step forward in the
reconciliation of the twin objectives of economic growth and en-
vironmental preservation.
It belatedly has come to be recognized that growth alone does
not constitute development, but rather that it must also entail a
fair distribution of its benefits, ie., a modicum of social welfare.
These are basic tenets of the New International Economic Order,
generally espoused by Third World countries, but in advancing
the cause of conservation and equating it with economic growth-
a goal whose mystique pervades developing societies-the eight
South American parties to the TAC have carried the concept of
development to a higher plane of international responsibility.
Venezuela 2,127.3
Average TAC members 1,063.10
LATIN AMERICA 1,076.80
(All figures are preliminary estimates for 1978 and are expressed in U.S. 1976 dollars. For
Suriname, preliminary estimates of GNP per capita for 1978 were taken from the World
Bank's 1979 Atlas). It is nevertheless important to note that these statistics do not ac-
curately reflect the situation of extreme underdevelopment and acute poverty prevalent
throughout the Amazonian territory.
I References to the goal of environmental preservation are also to be found in a prede-
cessor agreement, the Treaty on the River Plate Basin, signed in Brasilia on April 23, 1969
(likewise a Brazilian initiative), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 905 (1969), after which the TAC
has been to some extent patterned. See also special provisions on pollution in a follow-up in-
strument to the River Plate Treaty, e.g., the Treaty between Argentina and Uruguay, 13
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251(1974). A very recent expression of concern about reconciliation
between the objectives of economic development and conservation can be found in the
Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures relating to Economic Development,
19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 524 (1980).
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This they reaffirm in the following considerandum, when they
state that the contracting parties are "conscious that both socio-
economic development as well as conservation of the environment
are responsibilities inherent in the sovereignty of each State, and
that cooperation among [them] shall facilitate fulfillment of these
responsibilities, by continuing and expanding the joint efforts be-
ing made for the ecological conservation of the Amazon jungle."
The reference to national sovereignty which is emphasized
throughout the Treaty and which is characteristic of its approach
should be seen in the context of the essentially defensive nature
of this agreement, erga omnes. Confronted with the choice be-
tween a nationally-based strategy for Amazonian development
and the design of multilateral machinery to implement it, the
signatories of the Treaty clearly opted for the former alternative
which, however, debatable, is unequivocally and consistently
asserted in the Treaty.
The final two consideranda are interesting in that, by stressing
cooperation among the signatories on matters of common concern
as a step towards Latin American solidarity and (economic) in-
tegration, and by then labelling the TAC itself as "the beginning
of a process of cooperation," the parties to the Treaty, and notably
the Andean countries, have apparently sought to mitigate, if not
defuse, the thrust of the original Brazilian initiatives for such an
instrument. The original proposed by Brazil was clearly aimed at
the integration of the physical infrastructure of the Amazon basin.
Now it is loosely referred to in Article X of the Treaty but cer-
tainly not as its primary objective. While one can only conjecture
what the underlying motivation may have been, one plausible
assumption is that the Andean nations did not wish the TAC to be
symmetrical with, and hence potentially overshadow, the Car-
tagena Agreement of 1969, better known as the Andean Pact,
which instituted the community of five nations 8 sharing the An-
" The number of member states was six before Chile left in 1976. Largely inspired by
President Eduardo Frei of Chile, the Cartagena Subregional Integration Agreement, 8
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969), was signed in BogotA, Colombia, on May 26, 1969 on
behalf of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Per6, and was joined by Venezuela in 1973.
Its Secretariat and headquarters are located in Lima, Per6. For an analysis of the Agree-
ment's legal-institutional implications, see F. GARCIA-AMADOR, EL ORDENAMIENTO JURIDICO
ANDINO (1977). The rationale of preserving the supremacy of the Andean Pact over the
TAC also explains the cautious avoidance of the designation Pact for the Amazonian Trea-
ty, as proposed. For many years, there was a certain measure of diplomatic tension be-
tween the members of the Cartagena Agreement and Brazil (to some extent also with
Argentina), stemming in' part from the democratic bent of the six governments originally
involved, and this reserved atmosphere prevailed even during the negotiation of the TAC.
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dean cordillera, or mountain range, all of which are parties to the
TAC.
The key to the purpose and spirit of the Treaty lies in Article I,
whereby the signatories agree "to undertake joint actions and ef-
forts to promote the harmonious development of their respective
Amazonian territories in such a way that these joint actions pro-
duce equitable and mutually beneficial results and achieve also
the preservation of the environment, and the conservation and ra-
tional utilization of the natural resources of those territories." In
other words, development of each country's territory within the
Amazon region remains the country's sovereign prerogative, but
an effort will be made to reconcile these purely national initiatives
in an harmonious manner and thereby bring about joint actions
aiming at the development of the area according to stated para-
meters. Article X, which gives the priority goal of the Treaty as
being that "of fully incorporating [the Amazonian territories into
the contracting parties'] respective national economies," rein-
forces this notion.
From a legal standpoint, it can be inferred from the single
paragraph to Article I, as well as from other sections of the Trea-
ty (e.g., Articles VI and XVIII) which refer to the conclusion of
supplementary agreements, that the TAC is endowed with the
juridical characteristics of a trait4-cadre, an "umbrella agreement"
which for its full implementation requires the conclusion of com-
plementary and specific understandings and agreements. Indeed,
this is the nature of most integration agreements, including the
Treaty of Montevideo, which in 1960 established the Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Cartagena Agree-
ment itself, both of which contain basic principles and general
norms to be supplemented by ad hoc agreements and resolutions
in specific instances.19
Thus, when the TAC states that the parties would "prepare ...
the pertinent legal instruments which will permit the aims of the
present Treaty to be attained," it is establishing a legal frame-
work within which ad hoc agreements are to be developed in re-
It was defused, however, during the actual process of negotiation, by the visit of
Venezuelan President Carlos Andrds Pdrez to Brazil in 1977, by an encounter of the Presi-
dents of Brazil and Per6 at the border, and, in the aftermath of the Treaty's signature, by
the state visits of President Francisco Morales Bermidez of Per6 to Brazil, and of Brazilian
President Joao Baptista Figeiredo to Venezuela, both in 1979.
11 GARCIA-AMADOR, i&L at 66-68. See also INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS
JURIDICOS INTERNACIONALES, PROBLEMATICA JURIDICA E INSTITUCIONAL DE LA INTEGRACION DE
AMERICA LATINA: ENSAYO DE SISTEMATIZACION 738-41 (1967).
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sponse to actual needs. Normally, this delegation of competence
assumes the existence of some entity charged with the continuing
issuance of resolutions designed to implement the purposes of the
agreement, but in the case of the TAC there is none, except for
the Amazonian Cooperation Council and the periodic meetings of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the contracting parties, contem-
plated respectively in Articles XXI and XX of the Treaty (dis-
cussed below). The actual enforcement of the Treaty is entrusted
to Permanent National Commissions, which are to be established
in each member country (Article XXIII), but there is no perma-
nent international administrative entity, such as a Secretariat,
charged with this responsibility.
Article II of the Treaty defines its geographic scope, albeit in a
somewhat generic fashion, by stating its applicability to the terri-
tories of the contracting parties within the Amazonian Basin as
well as to any of their territories "which, by virtue of [their]
geographical, ecological or economic characteristics [are] con-
sidered closely connected with that Basin." This definition is
based primarily on political rather than scientific considerations,
since only the southermost fringe of the territories of Guyana,
Suriname and Venezuela can be said to be part of the Amazon
basin (they are part of the Orinoco basin), whereas French
Guyana, which is reached by some affluents of the Amazon river,
while clearly belonging to the latter's drainage basin, is excluded
from the Treaty.
Actually an overseas department of France, French Guyana is
one of the last non-sovereign territories in the Western hemi-
sphere, and is regarded in Latin America as a colonial enclave,
distinguished only by echoes of the Dreyfus case and, in more re-
cent times, by a rocket-firing aerospace research facility guarded
by the French Foreign Legion. In any event, its dependent status
vis-a-vis a European power would have made it most unwelcome
to the signatories of the TAC, an instrument with Monrovian
overtones of "Amazonia for the Amazonians." Thus, the southern
portion of the territories of Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname was
encompassed by the Treaty as having physical features resem-
bling those of the Amazon basin, but French Guyana was deliber-
ately excluded from its scope."
20 Both France and Trinidad & Tobago tried to join the TAC negotiations at an early
stage, but in both cases they were diplomatically turned down by consensus among the
negotiating countries.
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Article III of the Treaty sets forth in ample form the principle
of freedom of international commercial navigation on the Amazon
river "and other international Amazonian rivers," except for
cabotage. This section thus extends by reciprocity among the
eight TAC signatories the principle of free navigation granted by
unilateral acts, bilateral treaties and the principles and rules of in-
ternational law (regarding which, however, there still is no perfect
consensus in respect of navigation in international waterways, nor
indeed on the definition of what constitutes an international river;
presumably, an international Amazonian river is one within the
purview of the Amazon basin)."
Article VI of the Treaty states the goal of affirmative action by
the riparian states to facilitate free and unimpeded navigation by
means of the elimination of physical obstacles to it, "so as to
enable the Amazonian rivers to become an effective communica-
tion link among the contracting parties and the Atlantic Ocean."
Article V, however, commits the signatories to undertake "efforts
aimed at achieving rational utilization of the hydro resources."
Article IV reaffirms the sovereign right of each state to the ex-
clusive utilization of natural resources within its territory, the ex-
ercise of such right to be unfettered by any restrictions other
than those arising from international law. Herein lies some of the
rationale for the conclusion of this Treaty, which, in the fact of
heightened, international concern about the ecological damage
wrought in the Amazon region by a predatory and essentially un-
controllable exploitation, and in view of the actual or presumed
wealth of the area, led the TAC signatories to join forces in resist-
ing any external attempts, whether perceived or real, to exercise
control over its natural resources. Once again, it is the principle of
"Amazonia for the Amazonians." In Article XVI, the sovereignty
rule is again employed to preserve the unassailability of national
development projects not actually inconsistent with "international
law and practice between neighbouring and friendly countries,"
whatever that may be.'
Given the considerable difficulties encountered in the formulation of a definition of in-
ternational rivers, the U.N. International Law Commission, in its current consideration of
the topic "The law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses," has before it
at its 32nd session in Geneva (May 5-July 25, 1980) the second report prepared by Special
Rapporteur, Prof. Stephen M. Schwebel, wherein the concept of international watercourse
systems is substituted for that of international rivers. See his provisional second report,
mimeo, p. 28, Article I.
"This is yet another area wherein the law remains somewhat murky, albeit governed by
the ancient maxim of Roman law, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("Use your own so as
not to injure that which belongs to others"). Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 313-4
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Article V, already quoted, aims at the rational utilization of the
hydro resources of the Amazonian rivers, "taking account of the
economic and social development of the region." These functions,
of course, extend beyond navigation and encompass the use of
hydropower for the generation of electric energy, for which there
is a vast potential in the Amazon basin (e.g., the Brokopondo pro-
ject in Suriname and Tucurui in Brazil). Bearing in mind the
serious difficulties that have arisen within the framework of the
River Plate Basin between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in
respect of the allocation of waters of the Parana River for
hydropower utilization purposes, which difficulties have only
recently been resolved notwithstanding the presence of a similar
provision in the River Plate Basin Treaty (Article I, b), it is
understandable that the negotiators of the TAC, in line with the
latest thinking on multipurpose river basin development, should
have seen fit to devote a full section of the Treaty to this purpose.
The rule contained in Article XVI, of course, reflects the same
concern.
Article VII of the TAC raises no special legal issues, in that it
aims at the promotion of scientific research and information ex-
changes regarding conservation. Other provisions of the Treaty
(Articles I, paragraph; IX, paragraph 1, c; and notably XV) like-
wise seek to promote such exchanges of information among the
parties. Since this is a typical function of international administra-
tive secretariats, it is hard to see how such systems can be effec-
tively institutionalized in the absence of any permanent multi-
lateral machinery. While such machinery need not eo ipso be
multilateral in character, and might be centered in several na-
tional institutions which may have achieved an acknowledged
standard of excellence in certain functional activities, in practice
this would mean that the relatively more advanced countries
within the Amazon region, and particularly Brazil (which has
established an enviable installed capacity in each of the functional
sectors contemplated by the Treaty), would sponsor and probably
harbour the corresponding systems. This would detract from the
avowed intention of the TAC negotiators, and the Brazilian dele-
gation bent over backwards to ensure a relatively low profile, to
(7th ed. 1952). In support, see the Corfu Channel case, 1949 I.C.J. REP. 4, 16; the Trail
Smelter Arbitration, U.S.T.S. 893, 6 BEVANS 61-62; Lake Lanoux Arbitration 1959 I.L.R.
122-23; Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (Report of the
Conference, U.N. doc. A/C. 48/14/1972, Rev. 1, p. 5); Article 3, Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States as adopted in U.N.G.A. Resolution 3281 of December 12, 1974
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 255 (1975).
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avoid the preeminence of any of the contracting powers. This
helps to explain, although it does not fully justify, the absence of a
centralized permanent secretariat, which would almost neces-
sarily reflect Brazilian preeminence in a variety of fields.
Article XIX of the Treaty constitutes a standard disclaimer
clause, inserted at the insistence of those countries who have ter-
ritorial claims pending against them, to the effect that a signing of
the TAC may not be construed to imply acceptance or renuncia-
tion, in any manner whatsoever, of the position or interpretation
that any contracting party may hold on matters concerning limits
or territorial rights which may exist between the parties.
Coming to institutional issues, the Treaty employs a variety of
expressions to connote different degrees of cooperation among its
signatories in the pursuit of certain stated objectives. Thus, the
contracting parties agree to "cooperate" to increase the flow of
tourists into Amazonia (Article XIII), and to ensure the effective-
ness of measures aiming at the conservation of Amazonia's ethno-
logical and archaeological wealth (Article XIV); to "make efforts
aimed at achieving rational utilization of... hydro resources" (Ar-
ticle V); to "promote coordination of the present health services in
their respective Amazonian territories" (Article VIII); to "estab-
lish close cooperation in the fields of scientific and technological
research" (Article IX), to which end they may undertake inter alia
"joint or coordinated implementation of research and development
programmes;" to "undertake to study the most harmonious ways"
of establishing a suitable physical infrastructure in their Amazon-
ian territories (Article X); to "carry out studies into the means for
eliminating physical obstacles to ... navigation" (Article VI, para-
graph); to "encourage joint studies and measures aimed at pro-
moting the economic and social development of said territories"
(Article XI); to "present initiatives for undertaking studies" for
the elaboration of programmes of common interest (Article XVII);
to "seek to maintain" a permanent exchange of information and
cooperation among themselves etc. (Article XV); and to "under-
take joint actions and efforts to promote the harmonious develop-
ment of their respective Amazonian territories" (Article I). As can
be seen, the agreements range from the merely hortatory to ac-
tual commitments to take concrete action, but in all cases the
responsibility for actual implementation rests with the individual
governments concerned.
It may well be asked how this is to operate in practice, in view
of the admittedly rudimentary nature of institutional development
in the relatively less developed signatory nations of the TAC.
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Each member country is bound by Article XXIII of the Treaty to
create a Permanent National Commission charged with enforcing
in its territory the provisions set out in the Treaty, as well as with
the execution of the decisions taken at meetings of Foreign Af-
fairs Ministers and by the Amazonian Cooperation Council, "with-
out jeopardizing other tasks assigned to [it] by the State." How-
ever, it is difficult to conceive of any national institution, even
with the sophisticated paraphernalia of modern public administra-
tion in a developed country, which is capable of coping effectively
with the wide range of tasks listed in the Treaty, especially when
the venue of its implementation is as complex as that of the Ama-
zon basin. Were it not for the political factors already cited, this
Treaty would therefore have signified a perfect opportunity for
setting into place one or more technical agencies, and preferably a
small, highly skilled, centralized Secretariat capable of carrying
out these functions according to strictly multilateral criteria.
Since, however, this was apparently not viable in view of the
political atmosphere prevalent at the time of negotiation of the
Treaty (but which has improved considerably since), the TAC goes
about solving the problem of its own effective implementation in
several different and complementary ways:
1. it does not preclude such a possibility, and therefore opens
the way for a solution of this type if the political dynamics
of the situation should change and other circumstances war-
rant it;
2. it actually endorses the establishment of bilateral (and ulti-
mately multilateral) machinery for the achievement of cer-
tain targets (Arts. VI, IX, XI, XVIII and XXI, item 4); and
3. it allows resort to existing, external international ma-
chinery for certain specified purposes (Arts. IX, paragraph
2 and XV).
For the time being, the multilateral institutional mechanisms
contemplated in the Treaty with a view to its implementation are
fairly tenuous. They consist of Meetings of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the contracting parties, to be convened "when deemed
opportune or advisable, in order to establish the basic guidelines
for common policies, for assessing and evaluating the general
development of the process of Amazonian cooperation and for tak-
ing decisions designed to carry out the aims set out in [the
Treaty]" (Article XX). Also included is an Amazonian Cooperation
Council, comprised of top-level diplomatic representatives, which
is to meet once a year, basically in order "to ensure that the aims
and objectives of the Treaty are complied with," to carry out the
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decisions taken at the Foreign Ministers' meetings, to recommend
the convening of such meetings, "to take under consideration initi-
atives and plans presented by the [contracting parties] as well as
to adopt decisions for undertaking bilateral or multilateral studies
and plans, the execution of which, as the case may be, shall be the
duty of the Permanent National Commissions," and "to evaluate
the implementation of plans of bilateral or multilateral interest."
Whatever "teeth" the TAC may have, they are clearly vested in
the Amazonian Cooperation Council, and although there is room to
wonder about the adequacy of having a strategy for the develop-
ment of Amazonia entrusted to representatives of Foreign Minis-
tries, one can only hope that for substantive input they would
draw heavily on the technical departments of their own govern-
ments. While this has traditionally been the case in Brazil, one
may wonder about the situation in some of the other countries in-
volved. The Amazonian Cooperation Council, as previously indi-
cated, will not be able to rely upon the services of a permanent
Secretariat, however small; rather, it will have to contend with a
pro tempore Secretariat provided by the country in whose terri-
tory the next regular meeting of the Council is scheduled to be
held (Article XXII), the venue of such meetings being rotated in
alphabetical order among. the contracting parties (Article XXI,
paragraph 2). The sole function of the Secretariat, aside from ser-
vicing the meetings, is to distribute the pertinent documentation
among the parties.
If this arrangement may on the surface seem flimsy, it ought to
be remembered that there is a good precedent for it in Latin
America, in the creation of CECLA, the Special Economic Com-
mittee for Latin American Coordination, originally convened
under OAS auspices in 1963 and which eventually became a fairly
powerful lobbying instrument for the Latin American vis-a-vis the
industrialized countries, and provided the inspiration for the crea-
tion of a new, strictly Latin American organization, SELA, the
Latin American Economic System. 8 CECLA also functioned origi-
nally with no more than a pro tempore rotating Secretariat, but il-
lustrated the fact that it is the political will of the parties, rather
than the nature of their institutional arrangements, that deter-
mines the course of multilateral action. One may only hope that a
positive will for action will in time infuse the deliberations of the
Amazonian Cooperation Council. The results of the May 1980 elec-
U Bond, Regionalism in Latin America: prospects for the Latin American Economic
System (SELA), 32 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 401 (1978).
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tions in Peri, which brought to power a President who, during his
previous administration, had shown a strong commitment to Ama-
zonian development, give grounds to hope for such a favourable
prospect.
Consistent with the emphasis on national sovereignty, which
pervades the Treaty, all decisions taken at meetings of the For-
eign Ministers and of the Amazonian Cooperation Council shall re-
quire the unanimous vote of the parties to the TAC. Only in one
case, that of decisions taken at meetings held in accordance with
Article XXIV (Special Commissions set up by the parties to study
specific problems or matters related to the aims of the Treaty),
will the unanimous vote of the participating countries always be
required.
The final adjective clauses of the Treaty do not offer special in-
terest from a legal standpoint, except possibly Article XXVI,
which disallows "interpretive reservations or statements." Given
the Latin American tradition of virtually nullifying international
agreements by expressing reservations to them, this would seem
to be a healthy development, and consonant with the aims of the
Treaty. Likewise, Article XXVII, stipulating that it shall remain
in force for an unlimited period of time and shall not be open to
adherence, is consistent with the goals of the TAC and the politi-
cal definition of its geographic scope. The treaty became effective
thirty days after the deposit of the last instrument of ratification
by the contracting parties with the government of Brazil, which
acts as depositary, and shall cease to have effect for the contract-
ing party which denounces it one year after the denunciation has
been formalized, following by at least ninety days the communica-
tion to the depositary of the intention to denounce (Article XXVII).
III. THE TREATY AND A STRATEGY
FOR AMAZONIAN DEVELOPMENT
The world is starved for natural resources, of which there is an
abundant supply in the Amazon basin. This is especially relevant
in the light of active strategic stockpiling by the United States
and other nations, made inevitable by a recrudescence in interna-
tional political tensions. It is fair to predict that this will give
powerful impetus, in the medium- to long-term future, to the ex-
ploitation of Amazonian natural resources. Were it not so, it is
likely that the same nations who for four and a half centuries had
neglected the development of their Amazonian "hinterland" would
continue to do so, despite the existence of a Treaty whose princi-
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pal corollary is the creation of a collective awareness of the need
to develop the area, and to do so by means of harmonious strate-
gies. The fact that Amazonia may indeed attract international con-
cern suggests that financial and technical resources may be forth-
coming from external sources to assist them in this endeavor.
The Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation sets forth broad para-
meters for action intended to bring about economic growth and
environmental protection. If the institutions loosely created under
the terms of the Treaty, depending on the political will of the par-
ties, manage to monitor and reconcile national development ef-
forts within Amazonia so as to achieve a synergistic effect, the
formulation of a concerted strategy for the development of the
area ought not to present insurmountable obstacles. If imple-
mented harmoniously, as called for in the Treaty, such a strategy
would in effect mean the conquest, for the benefit of mankind, of
one of the last tracts of virtually virgin land on this planet. How-
ever, devising a development strategy for an area as complex as
Amazonia constitutes an extraordinary challenge to human in-
genuity. Although it has been observed that "Latin America
possesses the technical, financial and political capacity to rapidly
introduce modern large-scale technology, modifying aquatic and
terrestrial environments,"24 this power thus far resides only with
the largest countries, in this case Brazil, which would run against
the spirit of the Treaty, which rejects such preeminence. Quite
clearly, weak and underdeveloped states can scarely be expected
to meet this challenge. It follows that international development
agencies, whose multilaterial character ought to defuse political
sensitivities to foreign dominance, have a major opportunity in
this regard, as indeed is envisaged by the Treaty.
It would appear that one of the very first steps designed to put
into practice the objectives of the Treaty lies in the establishment
of a pre-investment agency for project identification, evaluation
and design. Nothing in the TAC precludes the creation of such an
agency by a unanimous decison of the Foreign Ministers pursuant
to a recommendation from the Amazon Cooperation Council. An
analogous course of action was followed in the establishment of
the Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin,
entrusted with the performance of similar tasks in that context.2"
2 Nelson & Lee, Environmental Dimension of Water Management in Latin America, 3
WATER SUPPLY AND MANAGEMENT 238 (1979).
Created by Resolution Nr. 5 of the IV Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the River Plate
Basin (Asunci6n, 1971). The Charter of the Fund was signed during the VI meeting (Buenos
Aires, June 12, 1974) and entered into force on October 14, 1976. The Fund's capital is US
$100 million, of which $20 million have been subscribed.
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If, in addition to capital subscriptions from the participating
governments, such an agency were able to count upon financial
contributions from such multilateral lending agencies as the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, its ability
to perform effectively in the area of pre-investment would be
enhanced correspondingly.
In the same vein, joint binational and multinational enterprises
could be set up, within the framework of the TAC, whether in-
tended for hydropower exploitation, for the development of trans-
port or mineral resources, or for any other purposes requiring
functional international cooperation. Successful examples of such
institutional arrangements elsewhere in Latin America, and
notably on the River Plate Basin hydroelectric works, suggests
that this approach is not only feasible but may in fact constitute
the most appropriate method of meeting the titanic challenge of
developing Amazonia."
While Amazonia is not a modern Eldorado, nor indeed solely a
Green Hell, the area does contain a wealth of natural resources
whose rational exploitation should contribute to bringing the
fruits of development to the nations whose territories encompass
the Amazon basin. It remains to be seen whether these nations
are capable of meeting this challenge through a convergence of
their long-term enlightened self-interests. In Amazonia, "most of
today's problems are traceable to past pursuits of conflicting and
mutually exclusive goals."27 Witness, e.g., the dichotomies be-
tween the simultaneous creation of an ample highway network in
a country-Brazil-suffering from a tremendous oil shortage and
with underdeveloped river navigation; the adoption of a regional
development model for the Brazilian Amazon fostering import-
substituting industrialization, and therefore requiring some
measure of infant-industry protection, while at the same time a
free trade zone was promoted in Manaus; and the official encour-
agement of human settlements along the highways while capital-
intensive manufacturing enterprises are given fiscal incentives.
, E. WHITE, EMPRESAS MULTINACIONALES LATINOAMERICANAS (1973) (Mexico). The most
striking examples of Latin American binational companies operating large hydroelectric
power complexes are Itaipu (Brazil-Paraguay), YaciretA (Argentina-Paraguay) and Salto
Grande (Argentina-Uruguay), all within the framework of cooperation in the River Plate
Basin. A similar arrangement is envisaged for a forthcoming power project, Corpus (Argen-
tina-Paraguay). Both the Itaipu Treaty of April 26, 1973, and the YaciretA Treaty of Decem-
ber 3, 1973, adopt the principle of common and indivisible property of the hydropower
potential flowing at the border on the ParanA River.
MAHAR, supra note 5, at 164.
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While these contradictions are due largely to the difficulties in-
herent in the planning process for an area as complex as Ama-
zonia, 8 the scarcity of reliable data -which the TAC attempts to
address-is an impediment to a better diagnosis of the area's ills,
and therefore to the prescription of appropriate therapies. If this
situation prevails even in Brazil, where massive efforts have been
undertaken with a view to gaining better insights into the Ama-
zonian reality, one can well imagine what the obstacles are in the
other countries wheresuch efforts have yet to be initiated on a
large scale.
It reflects favorably upon the maturity of judgment and the
pragmatism of the eight contracting parties to the Treaty for
Amazonian Cooperation that they have been able to reconcile
their political and other differences in order to lay the ground-
work for future joint endeavors, both bilateral and multilateral,
aiming at the integrated and balanced development of Amazonia.
The underlying recognition of the need for a cooperative approach
rather than unilateral action in the name of unfettered national
sovereignty must be regarded as constructive and hopeful. Viewed
as a point of departure for a grand, bold adventure on the thresh-
old of the twenty-first century, the Treaty assumes the propor-
tions of an act of enlightened statesmanship.
A. da Silva Lima, La mise en valeur de terres nouvelles: le cas de I'Amazonie
brdsilienne 345-51 (1973) (Doctoral thesis, Universit6 de Paris, I).
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